Two recent Iraq-related events hold special significance for Turkey. One is the terror agreement signed between Turkey and Iraq in Ankara. The other is the resolution adopted by the U.S. Senate on the desirability of a loose federal structure in Iraq.
The agreement signed between the Turkish and Iraqi Interior Ministers on combating PKK presence and activities in Iraq has generally met with skepticism by Turkish commentators. One opposition leader has called it “an omelet without an egg”. The main criticism is that the agreement does not contain the key clause of “hot pursuit”, thereby rendering the whole document ineffective and practically useless. Without it, the reasoning goes, the Turkish military cannot cross the border into Iraq to go after the PKK terrorists.
Yet looking at the agreement in a broader context may lead to a different assessment. This is the first time in the post-invasion period that Baghdad has committed itself formally to designating the PKK as terrorist and to fighting it. Such commitment has the merit of improving the international understanding for and the legitimacy of Turkey’s fight against the PKK. Most of the world visualizes the setting as “the big and mighty Turkey” trying to punish the “poor and defenseless Kurds”. Now, the Government of Iraq takes the position that Turkey is indeed engaged in a struggle against terrorism and that it is going to work with Turkey to this end. In combating PKK, this is more than what any other neighbor of Turkey has done to date, at least on the moral/ethical level.
There are several other reasons why I think this is a useful document. To the extent that Iraq actually implements the various provisions of the agreement, there will be substantial gains for both sides in terms of the restriction of the scope of PKK activities in Iraq and the prosecution of captured terrorists. Baghdad’s commitment should also serve as a tool of persuasion with the Kurdish authorities in the north to take an unequivocal stand against terror. In the end, it is important for Turkey to have the Arabs of Iraq on the same side in the fight against terrorism.
One final word is in order on the absence of the “hot pursuit” element in the agreement. If it were included and if Turkey were to undertake cross-border operations on that basis, would the negative ramifications and consequences of such action have been any less? In all probability, the Iraqi Kurds would have opposed it, Baghdad would not have been happy about it and the international community would have condemned it. The more critical point here is, however, that whether it is included in a bilateral arrangement or not, Turkey has the right to defend itself against threats to its national security. This is a fundamental concept of international law, enshrined in the UN Charter. To use this right, Turkey does not necessarily need Iraq’s permission. This is a determination the Turkish Government must ultimately make on its own.
Given the high cost of an intervention into Iraq under the present circumstances, Turkey must first try to engage the Kurdish authorities in Iraq. The agreement signed in Ankara gives greater ethical force to Turkey in this regard. The considerable Turkish influence in northern Iraq should be used by Turkey to make Kurdish leaders understand that it is also in their best interest to work with Turkey against PKK terror. If the Iraqi Kurds continue to refuse to cooperate, then Ankara will be justified in looking at other options.
The other event of interest to Turkey is the resolution the U.S. Senate adopted on Iraq. This idea of an Iraq divided into three parts (Sunni-center, Shiite-south and Kurdish-north) has been in circulation in some Washington circles for some time. Senator Joseph Biden has been the most prominent spokesperson of this idea. There have been other ideas on Iraq’s future. It is one thing for politicians and others in their individual capacities to come up with suggestions and proposals about an issue like Iraq. That is normal and useful. When, however, the upper chamber of the U.S. Congress with a huge bipartisan majority solemnly adopts a plan for another country’s future set-up, it is a completely new ball game. Even if it is not binding on President George Bush, the Senate resolution has moral force and with the kind of majority it has mustered, probably a lot of political power as well.
The Senate action is uncalled-for and inappropriate for reasons more than one. Reactions from within Iraq and from the Arab world show that the Senate action is uniformly unwelcome. First, the plan is not in Iraq’s interest because it is highly like to lead to the country’s disintegration, a process that would surely ignite and feed a long, bloody civil war, incomparably worse than the strife currently bleeding the country. It would lead to greater chaos and conflict in the already turbulent region by involving Iraq’s neighbors.
Second, the U.S. Senate does not (nor for that matter any legislative body anywhere) have the right to pronounce its designs or preferences for another country’s internal structure and organization. The people of Iraq have already approved a constitution and a system of governance for their country. There are still important and difficult issues to work out, but that is the Iraqi people’s business. Not the legislators of another country but only the people of Iraq can be the architects of their country’s future. Having set a most unfortunate precedent, the U.S. Senate is quite out of bounds here.
Finally, the Senate resolution gives a freehand and encouragement to all those forces and groups inside and outside Iraq to undermine that country’s territorial integrity and political unity. This part concerns Turkey. Turkey has been working with the U.S. administration to rebuild and stabilize Iraq, with the understanding that Turkey and the U.S.A. are both committed to preserving and protecting Iraq as a united country. Turkey would not and should not tolerate the fragmentation of Iraq. If the U.S. resolution is signaling a change in American policy toward Iraq, then there might be a further parting of ways between the two allies on the question of Iraq.
